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Abstract
Environmental policy is an area which has been quite heavily
proceduralised and is a rather peculiar example of ‘multi-level proceduralisation’
because of the presence of the Aarhus Convention. This paper explores the relevant
procedural provisions taken in the field of environmental law and in particular in
implementation of the Aarhus Convention, and examines the case law which has
involved these provisions. This case law is specifically discussed as concerns the way
in which the Court of Justice deals with the interaction between the relevant secondary
rules and the general principles of effectiveness and effective judicial protection, as
well as Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights concerning the right to an
effective remedy. It is shown that it is difficult to distill a consistent approach on the
part of the Court with regards to this interaction, and that much depends on the
specifics of the case and the question posed by the referring court. However, with the
latest case law, despite the apparent lack of underlying rights which would be able to
trigger the applicability of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Court of Justice
seems to be moving towards a heavier involvement of Article 47 of the Charter and,
consequently, of a ‘language of rights’, which increasingly plays a pivotal role in
boosting the effectiveness of the Aarhus Convention.
1. Introduction
The Aarhus Convention1 is a UN Convention which was de-
veloped within the UNECE (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe)
and is structured around three main pillars: access to information, public par-
ticipation, and access to justice in environmental matters aimed at promoting
environmental democracy. The Convention was adopted by the European
DOI 10.7590/187479819X15840066091349 1874-7981 2019 Review of European Administrative
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United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Convention on Access to Information,
Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, un-
1
ece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf accessed 12 October 2019. The EU
and all EU Member States are contracting parties to the Convention.
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Community on 17 February 2005 by Decision 2005/370/EC2 and is, therefore,
binding upon the EU as such, as well as the Member States when they act
within the scope of application of EU law.3
The access to justice pillar, which is of interest for the purposes of this paper,
is contained in Article 9 of the Convention. Article 9, in turn, contains access
to justice provisions linked to the access to environmental information and to
public participation, and a catch-all provision for any act or omission taken in
violation of environmental law. Interesting for the purposes of this paper are
especially Article 9(2) and (3) of the Convention, because they have given rise
to much litigation where the relationship between secondary rules of procedural
nature and the principles of effectiveness and effective judicial protection can
be explored.4
This paper will explore the relevant procedural provisions taken in the field
of environmental law and in particular as implementation of the Aarhus Con-
vention, and will examine the case law which has involved these provisions.
This case law will be specifically discussed as concerns the way in which the
Court of Justice deals with the interaction between the relevant secondary rules
and the general principles of effectiveness and effective judicial protection, as
well as Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights concerning the right
to an effective remedy. The environmental policy area is interesting with respect
to this interaction, because several of the applicable procedural provisions only
set minimum requirements, which leave room for manouver for the Member
States, thereby not fully pre-empting the field and leaving some space for na-
tional procedural autonomy. The environmental policy field can be thus be re-
Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2005 on the conclusion, on behalf of the
European Community, of the Convention on access to information, public participation in
decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters [2005] OJ L124/1.
2
It should also be added that, since all the Member States have ratified the Aarhus Convention,
this international instrument is binding on them outside the scope of application EU law as
3
well. However, in such cases, the effect of the Convention within the legal order of the Member
States is dependent upon their constitutional orders.
The literature on the Aarhus Convention and its access to justice pillar in relation to the EU
legal system is vast. See e.g. M. Pallemaerts (ed), The Aarhus Convention at Ten – Interactions
4
and Tensions between Conventional International Law and EU Environmental Law (Groningen,
Europa Law Publishing 2011); P. Oliver, ‘Access to Information and to Justice in EU Environ-
mental Law: the Aarhus Convention’ [2013] Fordham Journal of International Law 1423; J.
Maurici, ‘The Influence of the Aarhus Convention on EU Environmental Law: Part I’ [2013]
Journal of Planning and Environmental Law 1469, and J. Maurici, ‘The Influence of the Aarhus
Convention on EU Environmental Law: Part II’ [2014] Journal of Planning and Environmental
Law 181; M. Hedemann-Robinson, ‘EU implementation of the Aarhus convention’s third pillar:
Back to the future over access to environmental justice?-Part 1’ [2014] European Energy and
Environmental Law Review 102, and M. Hedemann-Robinson, ‘EU implementation of the
Aarhus convention’s third pillar: Back to the future over access to environmental justice?-Part
2’ [2014] European Energy and Environmental Law Review 151.
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garded as a ‘test case’ for the relevance and applicability of the principle of na-
tional procedural autonomy “in the presence of EU rules” (to dub the famous
Rewe adagio).5 Furthermore, in the environmental policy field, several of the
provisions adopted in this field are not meant to confer rights, but only to protect
the general interest, rendering it a virtually unique ‘playground’ for distilling
the possible differerences between the seemingly more ‘objective’ principle of
effectiveness, on the one hand, and the right-based principle of effective judicial
protection and Article 47 of the Charter, on the other hand.6
It will be shown that it is difficult to distill a consistent approach on the part
of the Court with regards to this interaction, and that much depends on the
specifics of the case and the question posed by the referring court. However,
with the latest case law, despite the lack of underlying rights which would be
able to trigger the applicability of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Court
of Justice seems to be moving towards a heavier involvement of Article 47 of
the Charter and, consequently, of a ‘language of rights’, which increasingly
plays a pivotal role in boosting the effectiveness of the Aarhus Convention. This
development, while positive in terms of ensuring an effective protection of EU
environmental law, is not fully in line with the wording of the Charter and
brings about a certain risk of conceptual confusion as to applicability of the
Charter and the remaining role for the case law based principles of effectiveness
and effectives judicial protection.
2. The Aarhus Convention and its (non-)transposition
by the European Union
As mentioned in the introduction, the main ‘driver’ of the proceduralisation
of environmental law at the EU level has been the Aarhus Convention and in
particular its access to justice provisions contained in Article 9(2) and (3).
In the Rewe case, the Court presented the principles of equivalence and effectiveness as limits
to the national procedural autonomy of the Member States, ‘[I]n the absence of Community
5
rules on this subject’. Case C-33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirt-
schaftskammer für das Saarland EU:C:1976:188. On the principle of national procedural autonomy,
see M. Bobek, ‘Why is there no principle of “procedural autonomy” of the Member States?’ in
H. W. Micklitz and B. de Witte (eds), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the
Member States (Antwerp, Intersentia 2012) 305-324.
See on the distinction between these notions, S. Prechal and R. Widdershoven, ‘Redefining
the relationship between “Rewe-effectiveness” and effective judicial protection’ [2011] Review
6
of European Administrative Law 31; J. Krommendijk, ‘Is there light on the horizon? The dis-
tinction between “Rewe effectiveness” and the principle of effective judicial protection in Article
47 of the Charter after Orizzonte’ [2016] Common Market Law Review 1395.
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Article 9(2) mandates certain requirements for access to justice with respect
to situations where the second pillar of the Convention (public participation)
is at stake. This article provides that the contracting parties should ensure that
concerned members of the public with (1) a sufficient interest; or (2) maintaining
impairment of a right (where the administrative procedural law of a state re-
quires this as a precondition), have access to a review procedure to challenge
the substantive and procedural legality of decisions concerning activities, subject
to the public participation requirements contained in Article 6 of the Convention
itself. Article 9(2) covers, in essence, projects which can have a significant en-
vironmental impact.
Article 9(3) provides for a general access to justice obligation, which the
Convention refers to as “access to administrative or judicial procedures to
challenge acts and omissions by private persons and public authorities which
contravene provisions of […] national law relating to the environment”.
Article 9(4), furthermore, requires contracting parties to provide adequate
and effective remedies for violations of environmental law, including injunctive
relief and to ensure that judicial review procedures be fair, equitable, timely
and not prohibitively expensive.
With a view to aligning Member States’ legislation with Article 9(2) and (4)
of the Convention, the EU has enacted Directive 2003/35/EC,7 which concerns
public participation in relation to the authorisation of specific industrial activities
affecting the environment.
With regard to access to justice provisions, this Directive has inserted Article
10a into the text of Directive 85/337/EC (the Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA) Directive)8 and Article 15a into the text of Directive 69/61/EC (the Inte-
grated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive).9 Subsequently, these
provisions have been transferred to the most recent versions of the EIA Directive
and the IPPC Directives without any changes, and they are currently to be found
Directive 2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 providing
for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating
7
to the environment and amending with regard to public participation and access to justice
Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC [2005] OJ L156/17.
Council Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private
projects on the environment [1985] OJ L175/40.
8
Council Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996 concerning integrated pollution prevention
and control [1996] OJ L257/26.
9
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in Article 11 of Directive 2011/92/EU10 on the assessment of certain public and
private projects on the environment and Article 25 of the recast Directive
2010/75/EU on industrial emissions.11
Unlike Article 9(2), Article 9(3) of the Convention has not been trasposed
through secondary binding legislation. A legislative proposal was indeed tabled
by the Commission in 2003,12 but was never adopted and eventually withdrawn.13
Instead, the Commission has recently published a non-binding Communication
where it tries to set minimum standards for national courts to apply the require-
ments of the Aarhus Convention.14
Having sketched the main provisions of the Aarhus Convention, this contri-
bution will now turn to the examination of the relevant secondary EU law rules
which have sought to transpose the Aarhus Convention and the case law in
which they interacted with the principles of effectiveness and effective judicial
protection, as well as Article 47 of the Charter.
3. The interaction between secondary rules,
effectiveness and effective judicial protection in the
case law of the Court of Justice relating to Article
9(2) and Article 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention: still
in search of a coherent script?
3.1. Standing
As does Article 9(2) of the Convention, Directive 2003/35
provides two models of access to justice. While leaving Member States free to
provide access to civil or administrative courts, the Directive requires them to
Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on
the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment [2012]
10
OJ L26/1. Please note that the latest amendments to the EIA Directive brought by Directive
2014/52/EU did not touch Article 11. Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 16 April 2014 amending Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects
of certain public and private projects on the environment [2014] OJ L124/1.
Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010
on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) [2010] OJ L334/17.
11
Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access
to justice in environmental matters’ COM(2003) 624 final.
12
Withdrawal of obsolete Commission proposals [2014] OJ C153/3.13
Commission, ‘Commission Notice on Access to Justice in Environmental Matters’ COM(2017)
2616 final. For a comment see J. Darpö, ‘On the Bright Side (of the EU’s Janus Face). The EU
14
Commission’s Notice on Access to Justice in Environmental Matters’ [2017] Journal for European
Environmental & Planning Law 373.
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provide access to a review procedure wherein qualified members of ‘the public
concerned’ can challenge ‘the substantive or procedural legality’ of decisions
that are subject to the participation requirements mandated by the underlying
Directives. However, the provisions leave the parties free to decide whether to
allow standing for the ‘public concerned’ only where the claimant can maintain
the impairment of a right or when it is able to show a ‘sufficient interest’.
Just like the Aarhus Convention, Directive 2003/25 does not directly define
what is meant with the standing tests proposed: instead, Articles 10a and 15a
state that what constitutes a sufficient interest and impairment of a right shall
be determined by the Member States, subject, however, to two conditions.
Firstly, ‘sufficient interest’ and ‘impairment of a right’ should be interpreted
consistently with the objective of giving the public concerned wide access to
justice. Secondly, any NGO promoting environmental interests and meeting
any requirements under national law shall be deemed as capable of showing
sufficient interest. Such organisations shall also be deemed to have rights capable
of being impaired in a legal system that has opted for a rights-based approach.
This much-debated provision has come to the attention of the Court of
Justice in a number of groundbreaking cases.
In the Djurgården case,15 the CJEU ruled that a requirement of Swedish law
that an NGO had to have at least 2000 members to have access to court did not
ensure a ‘wide access to justice’ and did not comply with the standards set by
Directive 2003/35/EC. The answer in this case was submitted by the national
court, and was answered by the Court of Justice, exclusively on the basis of the
requirements of secondary law.
A few years after the Djurgården case, the CJEU decided on another prelim-
inary reference in the Trianel case, this time sent by a German court and con-
cerning the German transposition of Directive 2003/35/EC.16 According to the
contested German provisions, non-governmental organisations promoting en-
vironmental protection were granted standing before a court, in an action con-
testing a decision authorising projects likely to have ‘significant effects on the
Case C-263/08 Djurgården-Lilla VärtansMiljöskyddsföreningvStockholms kommun genom dess
marknämnd EU:C:2009:631.
15
Case C-115/09 Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen
eVvBezirksregierung Arnsberg EU:C:2011:289. See for a discussion of this case and other relevant
16
cases examined in this paper, M. Eliantonio and F. Grashof, ‘Wir mussen reden! - We need to
have a serious talk! The interaction between the infringement proceedings and the preliminary
reference procedure in ensuring compliance with EU environmental standards: A case study
of Trianel, Altrip and Commission v Germany’ [2016] Journal for European Environmental &
Planning Law 325.
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environment’ for the purposes of Article 1(1) of the EIA Directive, only where
they could show the potential infringement of a rule which confers individual
rights. However, in the proceedings before the national court, the NGO was
not maintaining the impairment of an individual right. Instead, it was seeking
to challenge an administrative measure in so far as it authorised activities which,
while not violating an individual’s subjective rights, were likely to harm the
environment as such. The question posed by the German judge was whether
the German transposition of Directive 2003/35 could be considered to be in
line with the requirement of ‘wide access to justice’ mandated by the Directive
and the Aarhus Convention. The question of the national court was thus exclu-
sively posed in terms of the compliance of national transposing law with EU
secondary law. The answer of the Court of Justice in Trianel was instead based
on both EU secondary law and the principle of effectiveness.
First, it held that whichever option a Member State chooses for the admissi-
bility of an action (i.e. a right-based or an interest-based model), environmental
protection organisations were entitled, pursuant to Article 10a of the EIA Direc-
tive, to have access to a review procedure before a court of law or another inde-
pendent and impartial body established by law, to challenge the substantive or
procedural legality of decisions, acts or omissions covered by that Article. This
possibility had to be guaranteed, according to the Court, even where the rules
relied on protected only the interests of the general public, and not the rights
or interests of individuals. The German rules which prevented such challenges
were therefore considered in breach of Article 10a.
The Court then seemed to move on to further test the German rules against
the principle of equivalence and effectiveness. However, while it started reiter-
ating the mantra of procedural autonomy, as qualified by equivalence and ef-
fectiveness, it did not in practice test the national measure against the principles.
Instead it linked the German legislation back to Article 10a of Directive
2003/35/EC.17 It thus seems that the principle of effectivess in this case was
Ibid, “43. Lastly, it should also be recalled that where, in the absence of EU rules governing
the matter, it is for the legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals
17
having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safe-
guarding rights which individuals derive from EU law, those detailed rules must not be less
favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and must
not make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by EU
law (principle of effectiveness). 44. Thus, although it is for the Member States to determine,
when their legal system so requires and within the limits laid down in Article 10a of Directive
85/337, what rights can give rise, when infringed, to an action concerning the environment,
they cannot, when making that determination, deprive environmental protection organisations
which fulfil the conditions laid down in Article 1(2) of that directive of the opportunity of playing
the role granted to them both by Directive 85/337 and by the Aarhus Convention.”
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used merely as a ‘cosmetic’ addition, but did not bring any added value either
to the reasoning or to the end result reached by the Court.18
The Court referred to Trianel in a later case, which concerned the possibility
for inviduals to challenge a decision through which the competent Austrian
authorities had decided that an EIA was not necessary. In Gruber,19 the Court
reiterated the possibility to chose for a right-based or an interest-based model
of standing, in accordance, however, “with the objective of giving the public
concerned wide access to justice”. As in Trianel, the Court went on to discuss
the question of procedural autonomy, equivalence, and effectiveness, but did
not subsequently test the national provisions against the principles.20
3.2. Costs of proceedings
Directive 2003/35, as does Article 9(4) of the Aarhus Conven-
tion, requires procedures not to be ‘prohibitively expensive’. This aspect is linked
to the overall aim of the Aarhus Convention in that excessive costs of legal
proceedings could effectively operate as a deterrent for members of the public
and NGOs from seeking recourse through a judicial review mechanism.
This requirement has in turn been interpreted in some instances by the
CJEU, which has sanctioned some Member States for failing to fully comply
with the Directive.
In Commission v Ireland the Court had to rule on the implementation into
Irish law of the obligation that procedures should not be prohibitively expens-
ive.21 According to the Court the requirement does not prevent national courts
from making cost orders addressed to unsuccessful litigants.22 However, a mere
practice by courts aimed at reducing or at not imposing costs on litigants with
insufficient means was not seen as sufficient implementation of the Public
Participation Directive. In this case, the infringement procedure was merely
based on Ireland’s failure to correctly transpose the Directive and the Court
only based its conclsions on secondary law provisions.
See for a slightly different opinion Rob Widdershoven, who, albeit in cautious terms, argues
that the Trianel case shows that “the principle of effectiveness might still have some impact,
18
as it may strengthen the EU law prescribed procedural rules”. R. Widdershoven, ‘National
Procedural Autonomy and General EU Law Limits’, in this special issue of Review of European
Administrative Law, 5.




C-427/07 Commission of the European Communities v Ireland EU:C:2009:457.21
Ibid [92].22
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Furthermore, the CJEU addressed the costs regime of the United Kingdom
in Edwards23 and Commission v UK,24 and it held that the discretionary practice
of the UK courts to award protective cost orders contravened the requirements
of the Public Participation Directive.
In Edwards, the CJEU specifically mentioned that a legal cost assessment
by a national court should not be carried out solely on the basis of the financial
situation of the person concerned, but must also be based on an objective
analysis of the amount of the costs, particularly since members of the public
and associations are naturally required to play an active role in defending the
environment. Therefore, in the view of the Court, the cost of proceedings must
neither exceed the financial resources of the person concerned nor appear, in
any event, to be objectively unreasonable.25
In this case, the Court added an interesting point on the right to an effective
remedy contained in the Charter and ‘Rewe-based’ the principle of effectiveness.
Despite the fact that the infringement proceedings was based on the failure of
the UK to correctly transpose Directive 2003/35 (and only the Directive is
mentioned in the operative part of the ruling), the Court felt the need to add
that
‘[m]oreover, the requirement that the cost should be “not prohibitively ex-
pensive” pertains, in environmental matters, to the observance of the right to
an effective remedy enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, and to the principle of effectiveness, in accor-
dance with which detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding
an individual’s rights under European Union law must not make it in practice
impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by European
Union law.’26
It therefore seems that, in the line of reasoning of the court, the argument
based on the right to an effective remedy and the principle of effectiveness was
as such not necessary to reach its conclusion, but could contribute to strength-
ening it. Interestingly, this point was later taken up and given more emphasis
Case C-260/11 The Queen, on the application of David Edwards and Lilian Pallikaropoulos v Envi-
ronment Agency and Others EU:C:2013:221.
23
Case C-530/11European Commission v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
EU:C:2014:67.
24
Case C-260/11 The Queen, on the application of David Edwards and Lilian PallikaropoulosvEnvi-
ronment Agency and Others EU:C:2013:221, para 40.
25
Ibid [33].26
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by the Commission Communication on Access to Justice which states that “a
cost regime has therefore to be shaped in such a way as to guarantee that rights
conferred by the EU can be effectively exercised”.27 [emphasis added] It seems
that the Commission is making of the Court’s statement reported above more
than what the Court actually meant, by reading in the Court’s ruling an obliga-
tion which the Court itself only mentioned in passing.
In Commission v UK, the CJEU tackled the costs during interim proceedings
and specifically the UK system of cross-undertaking in damages. The purpose
of the latter is to ensure that the party subject to an interim injunction is com-
pensated if the court subsequently decides against the party requesting the in-
junction and the other party has in the meantime suffered a loss as a con-
sequence of complying with the injunction. The Court considered that this
system was not sufficiently clear as to comply with the ‘not prohibitively expens-
ive’ requirement, and did not further make any argument on the principles of
effectiveness or effective judicial protection.28
3.3. Scope of review
While not mandating a specific depth of review, Directive
2003/35 requires national procedural rules to allow courts to review the ‘sub-
stantive and procedural legality’ of decisions falling within the scope of applica-
tion of Article 9(2) of the Convention. This requirement is rather vague and
allows for quite some discretion on the part of the Member States.
However, it has also been given some flesh by the case law of the CJEU,
which stated that, while Member States can limit access to court to challenge
procedural defects which have no conceivable influence on the final adminis-
trative decision, they cannot put on the applicant the burden of proof that a
procedural defect had an impact on the final decision.29
The Altrip case in an interesting example of interaction between secondary
procedural rules and the principle of effectiveness and effective judicial protec-
tion. The question posed by the referring court, as in the cases above, only
concerned the compliance of the relevant German legislation with Directive
2003/35. However, the Court of Justice added to the reasoning also an argument
based on the principle of effectiveness.
Commission, ‘Commission Notice on Access to Justice in Environmental Matters’ COM(2017)
2616 final, para 177.
27
Case C-530/11 European Commission v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
EU:C:2014:67, paras 70-72.
28
Case C-72/12 Gemeinde Altrip and OthersvLand Rheinland-Pfalz EU:C:2013:712.29
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In particular, the Court ‘inserted’ the argument concerning the principles
‘inside’ the margin of discretion left by the EU legislator by the relevant second-
ary rules. The Court indeed recognised that Member States are left with a
margin of discretion to establish, according to their domestic systems, what a
‘right’ capable of giving access to court is. However, according to the Court,
“the conditions fixed by the Member States for that purpose may not make it
in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred
by that directive”.30 The Court, in the end, examined the German rules and
concluded that they did not comply with the relevant EU secondary rules, but
did not apply (at least explicitly) the test of effectiveness it outlined.
In a follow-up to the Altrip case, the Commission brought infringement
proceedings against Germany and challenged the general national procedural
provision requiring the impairment of a right to obtain the annulment of an
administrative measure.31 The Court held that such a requirement does not vi-
olate EU law, but it did hold that a Member State cannot limit the scope of ju-
dicial review to the question of whether a decision not to carry out an environ-
mental impact assessment was valid. The Court observed that excluding the
applicability of judicial review in cases in which, having been carried out, an
environmental impact assessment is found to be vitiated would render largely
nugatory the provisions of Directive 2003/35. In this case, no mention of the
principles of effectiveness and effective judicial protection is made.
3.4. Remedies
Finally, although the Aarhus Convention obliges the Contrac-
ting Parties to provide for adequate and effective remedies, this requirement
cannot be found in Directive 2003/35. However, this requirement should still
be considered as applicable in the EU legal order as, according to the case law
of the CJEU, EU legislation implementing the Aarhus Convention must be in-
terpreted in line with the latter.32
The CJEU has partially intervened to fill this gap. By relying on earlier case
law on this issue33 it stated that, despite the absence of national procedural rules
Ibid [46].30
Case C-137/14 European Commissionv Federal Republic ofGermany EU:C:2015:683.31
M. Eliantonio, ‘The Proceduralisation of EU Environmental Legislation: International Pressures,
Some Victories and Some Way to Go’ [2015] Review of European Administrative Law 111.
32
Case C-213/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others
EU:C:1990:257, para 21, and Case C-432/05 Unibet (London) Ltd and Unibet (International) Ltd
v Justitiekanslern EU:C:2007:163, para 67.
33
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to this effect, national courts are able to avail themselves of interim measures
to prevent environmental damage (a requirement which, although explictly
present in Article 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention, has also (inexplicably) not
been incorporated in Directive 2003/35).34
The Križan case is interesting because, as the Altrip case discussed above,
it sheds light on how the Court of Justice seems to understand the relationship
between secondary procedural rules and the principles of effectiveness and ef-
fective judicial protection in the field of environmental law. In particular, the
Court argued that
By virtue of their procedural autonomy, the Member States have discretion
in implementing Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention and Article 15a of Directive
96/61, subject to compliance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.
It is for them, in particular, to determine, in so far as the abovementioned
provisions are complied with, which court of law or which independent and
impartial body established by law is to have jurisdiction in respect of the review
procedure referred to in those provisions and what procedural rules are appli-
cable.35
It seems therefore that the Court understands the requirements of the
Public Participation Directive as ‘minimum harmonisation’ and that therefore
within those requirements the Member States are free to chose their own pro-
cedural rules, which remain still subject to the respect of the principles of
equivalence and effectiveness.
3.5. Interim conclusions
The table below provides an overview of the case law discussed
and the way in which the Court considered the relationship between the relevant
secondary rules and the principles of effectiveness and effective judicial protec-
tion.
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It seems possible, on the basis of this overview, to conclude that no coherent
and consistent approach can be distilled in the case law of the Court of Justice
with respect to the requirements set in Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention
and the transposing legislation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, much seems to depend
on the way in which the ‘claim’ is phrased by the Commission in the infringe-
ment proceedings or the question is posed by the national courts in the prelim-
inary questions. At the same time, this approach does not contribute to shed
light on the interaction and relationship between procedural secondary law and
the principles of effectiveness and effective judicial protection.
It is also interesting to note, however, that, in some instances, the Court has
ventured beyond what was strictly required to give judgment in the case at stake
and discussed the requirements of effectiveness (and, less often, those of effec-
tive judicial protection) as ‘additional’ limits to the margin of discretion afforded
to the Member States when transposing secondary procedural rules which offer
a certain room for manouver to domestic legislators. This development is one
which should be highlighted because it goes to show that, even in the presence
of EU procedural harmonization, when the field is not fully ‘pre-empted’ by
EU legislation, national procedural rules still need to respect the requirements
of effectiveness and effective judicial protection.
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4. The non-transposition of Article 9(3) and the
growing relevance of Article 47 of the Charter
4.1. The confusion in LZ I
As mentioned above, Article 9(3) of the Convention has not
been transposed into binding secondary EU law. Because of this lack of trans-
position, a Slovakian court sent a preliminary question asking the Court of
Justice to rule on whether the Convention provision could be considered as
having direct effect before the national courts. While holding that Article 9(3)
of the Aarhus Convention does not have direct effect, the Court did require
national courts to interpret national law to the fullest extent possible in such a
way as to provide access to non-governmental organisations alleging the violation
of EU environmental law.36
In the LZ I ruling, likely because of the lack secondary law in the matter,
the Court gave a much clearer prominence to the principles of equivalence and
effectiveness as a basis for the duty of consistent interpretation imposed on the
national courts, than in any of the case law which was brought on the basis of
the legislation transposing Article 9(2). However, the Court ‘swings’ in the
reasoning between an ‘effectiveness’ language and one based on ‘effective judi-
cial protection’. Having denied that Article 9(3) could contain obligations which
are sufficiently clear and precise for the provision to have direct effect, the Court
continued to state that:
‘… it must be observed that those provisions, although drafted in broad
terms, are intended to ensure effective environmental protection.
47. In the absence of EU rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic
legal system of each Member State to lay down the detailed procedural rules
governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU
law, in this case the Habitats Directive, since the Member States are responsible
for ensuring that those rights are effectively protected in each case […].
48. On that basis, as is apparent from well-established case-law, the detailed
procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding an individual’s rights under
EU law must be no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions
(principle of equivalence) and must not make it in practice impossible or exces-
sively difficult to exercise rights conferred by EU law […].
Case C-240/09 Lesoochranárskezoskupenie VLKvMinister stvoživotného prostredia Slovenskej re-
publiky (‘LZ I’) EU:C:2011:125.
36
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49. Therefore, if the effective protection of EU environmental law is not to
be undermined, it is inconceivable that Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention
be interpreted in such a way as to make it in practice impossible or excessively
difficult to exercise rights conferred by EU law.’
It can be observed that the Court starts from the perspective of “effective
environmental protection”, moves to talk about “safeguarding rights which in-
dividuals derive from [..] the Habitats Directive” and individual’s rights under
EU law, then returns to “effective protection of EU environmental law” and
closes with “rights conferred by EU law”. The Court, therefore, blurs the distinc-
tion between the principle of effectiveness and that of effective judicial protec-
tion,37 or at least ‘appends’ the effective protection of EU environmental law to
the principle of effectiveness.
However, it is not clear which ‘rights’ are conferred by the Habitats Direc-
tive,38 considering that this instrument has as main aim the protection of
biodiversity and the Court also does not specify further how the provision which
was allegedly violated by the Slovak authorities (and which concerned the pos-
sible derogations from the prohibition of hunting the brown bear) could be
construed as conferring rights. This matter seems to be taken somewhat for
granted in the Commission Communication of Access to Justice, where the
Commission first states that “[T]he species protection provisions of this directive
do not aim at protecting individuals but the environment, and this in the gen-
eral interest of the public”.39 Then, with an long-stretched interpretative jump,
it concludes that “[T]herefore, the CJEU acknowledged that the claimant envi-
ronmental NGO had a right that deserved judicial protection in the specific
case, such as that of rendering the provisions of the Habitats Directive,
92/43/EEC, enforceable”.40 Where the Commission reads this conclusion in
the LZ I ruling is not clear, and no paragraph of the ruling is quoted.41
On this point see S. Prechal and R. Widdershoven, ‘Redefining the Relationship between
“Rewe-effectiveness” and Effective Judicial Protection’ [2011] Review of European Administrative
Law 31.
37
Council Directive 92/43/EC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora
[1992] OJ L206/7.
38
Commission, ‘Commission Notice on Access to Justice in Environmental Matters’ COM(2017)
2616 final, para 40.
39
Ibid.40
This latter point deserves some attention, especially in light of the fact the Communication as
a whole contains a very dense body of references to specific paragraphs of the relevant case
law.
41
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While not directly tackling the relationship between secondary procedural
rules and the principles of effectiveness and effective judicial protection (because
of the lack of secondary rules taken in implementation of Article 9(3) of the
Aarhus Convention), the LZ I ruling shows the first step towards a ‘language
of rights’, which would subsequently be confirmed and applied also in an ‘Ar-
ticle 9(2) situation’ where secondary procedural rules do exist. The following
section discusses this case law.
4.2. LZ II – taking the principle of effective judicial protection
in environmental matters to the next level
The prominence of the principle of effective judicial protection
is even more evident in the follow-up case of LZ I. In LZ II, the Court was asked
to consider a provision of Slovakian law according to which it was not possible
for a court to rule on the possibility for an NGO to participate in an administra-
tive decision-making process after the judicial proceedings on the legality of
the decision which closed the decision-making process have been definitively
concluded.42 The referring court in particular questioned whether such a rule,
which in the case at stake precluded the applicant NGO from pleading a violation
of the Habitats Directive by the Slovak authorities, complied with Article 47 of
the Charter.
The Court started with subsuming the legal problem under Article 9(2) of
the Convention, since it took the view that the decision authorising the project
in question, which is to be carried out on a site protected pursuant to the Hab-
itats Directive as a special protection area or site of Community importance,
was adopted in breach of the national authorities’ obligations under Article 6(3)
of that Directive. According to the Court, this provision falls within the scope
of Article 6(1)(b) of the Aarhus Convention (and triggers the applicability of
Article 9(2) of the Convention), which mandates public participation require-
ments for projects which, while not being in the list of projects contained in
Annex I of the Convention, nevertheless are considered as producing significant
effects on the environment. According to the Court “the fact that the competent
national authorities decided to initiate an authorisation procedure for that project
pursuant to Article 6(3) of Directive 92/43 permits […] the inference that those
authorities considered it necessary to assess the significance of the project’s
effect on the environment, within the meaning of Article 6(1)(b) of the Aarhus
Convention”.43
Case C-243/15 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v Obvodný úrad Trenčín EU:C:2016:838.42
Ibid [47].43
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The Court thus identifies the relevant right in the right to participate in en-
viromental decision-making (as provided by Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention)
and continues to speak the ‘language of rights’ (and of the Charter specifically)
for the remainder of the ruling. In particular, the Court held that automatically
dismissing an action against an administrative decision refusing the status of
party to the administrative decision-making process as soon as the permit applied
for is granted, does not enable an environmental NGO to be ensured effective
judicial protection of the “rights inherent in the right of public participation”,44
within the meaning of Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention. The Court’s insist-
ence on the ‘language of rights’ is all the more striking if compared to the ap-
proach taken by the Advocate General, who instead assimilated the right an
effective judicial protection (enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter) into the
principle of effectiveness.45
This ruling constitutes a big leap forward in the protection of environmental
democracy and EU environmental law. First of all, because the Court expanded
the reach of Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention to areas where no EU sec-
ondary legislation has been enacted on access to justice. As suggested by the
Commission Communication on Access to Justice, “the rationale behind the
CJEU's interpretation lends itself to be applied by analogy to decision-making
processes in other sectors of EU environmental law such as water and waste”.46
Secondly, because, for the first time so clearly, the Court relied on the right to
an effective remedy and Article 47 of the Charter in the context of the Aarhus
Convention.
4.3. The grand finale: Protect
Another major breakthrough in the context of the increasing
use of Article 47 of the Charter by the Court of Justice in environmental matters
is represented by the case Protect.47 The case concerned a permit to abstract
water from a river for the purposes of producing snow for a ski resort. This was
Ibid [68].44
Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-243/15 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v Obvodný úrad Trenčín
EU:C:2016:491, para 99, “the principle of effectiveness, in so far as this gives effect to Article
45
47 of the Charter”. See also L. Ankersmit, ‘Article 47 of the Charter precludes national proce-
dural rules that allow decisions to be taken in environmental matters pending litigation on
participation in that decision-making’ [2017] European Journal of Risk Regulation 448.
Commission, ‘Commission Notice on Access to Justice in Environmental Matters’ COM(2017)
2616 final, 70.
46
Case C-664/15 Protect Natur-, Arten- und Landschaftsschutz Umweltorganisation EU:C:2017:987.
For a discussion of this case and another case examined in this paper, see Ch. Sobotta, ‘New
47
Cases on Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention: Court of Justice of the EU, Judgments of 20
December 2017, Protect, C-664/15, and of 15 March 2018, North East Pylon Pressure Campaign
and Sheehy, C-470/16’ [2018] Journal for European Environmental & Planning Law 241.
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a permit issued under the relevant Austrian legislation implementing the Water
Framework Directive, hence outside the scope of the application of the Environ-
mental Impact Assessment Directive and Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention.
An NGO was denied status of party to the administrative decision-making
proceedings leading to the granting of the permit and, consequently, on the
basis of Austrian procedural law, it was denied standing to challenge the permit
itself, which was ultimately granted by the competent national authorities.
The Court held that such a limitation is incompatible with Article 9(3) of
the Aarhus Convention, read in combination with Article 47 of the Charter. In
particular, the Court held that, while both the principle of national procedural
autonomy and the margin of discretion afforded to Member States by Article
9(3) allowed domestic legislation to impose certain limitations to the standing
of NGOs, “[I]mposing those criteria must not deprive environmental organisa-
tions in particular of the possibility of verifying that the rules of EU environ-
mental law are being complied with, given also that such rules are usually in
the public interest, rather than simply in the interests of certain individuals,
and that the objective of those organisations is to defend the public interest”.48
The opposite solution would deprive Article 9(3) of its effects, and “even its very
substance”.49
What is interesting is that, as in LZ II, the Court strived to read a ‘right’ into
the situation brought before it. The ‘trick’ used in LZ II, namely to find a right
in the right to participate in the decision-making process could not be used in
this case, to the exent to which the Court did not consider the matter as falling
within the scope of application of Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention. In
this context, the reasoning of the Court again ‘swings’ between ‘the rights that
an environmental organisation derives from Article 4 of Directive 2000/60’
(i.e. the Water Framework Directive)50 and ‘the rights set out in Article 9(3) of
the Aarhus Convention’.51 As in LZ I, the Court does not explain how the relevant
provision of the Water Framework Directive, which concerns Member States’
obligations to take measures to prevent the deterioration of the status of all
bodies of surface water, can be construed as conferring rights. In this context,
it should be noted that, while the Advocate General, in the context of the discus-
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clearly stated that this provision cannot be construed as conferring rights,52 the
Court of Justice instead did not touch upon this point. Instead, it quickly moves
to state that the Charter and its Article 47 were applicable, and that Article 9(3)
had to be read in the light of this latter provision.
This is a rather bold move on the part of the Court which certainly contrib-
utes to broaden NGO standing before national courts, even in lack of transpos-
ition of Article 9(3) and of direct effect of this provision.53 This position also
seems to confirm the trend of the Court of Justice, identified by others in this
Special Issue, to ‘boost’ the applicability of the Charter by making it applicable
also beyond clear situations in which a fundamental right is at stake.54
A final word of caution should, however, be spent in order to not definitely
herald Protect as a new dawn for Article 47 of the Chapter in the context of en-
vironmental litigation. The most recent55 of the cases on secondary procedural
provisions in the environmental field casts indeed a – albeit small – shadow on
the light irradiated by Protect. In the Pylon case, which was decided only three
months after Protect, indeed, the Court took a much more conservative ap-
proach.56 The case originated in a dispute about a powerline project in Ireland,
in which the applicants alleged, amongst others, the violation of the Environ-
mental Impact Assessment Directive. The Court of Justice was asked whether
the applicants could rely on cost protection under the relevant provision EIA
Directive or Article 9(4) of the Convention. In the ruling, the Court refrained
from making an any argument based on the Charter and instead replicated the
reasoning employed of LZ I and only mentioned (in the same intertwined and
Which, incidentally, according to the AG, did not prevent the provision from having direct effect.
See Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-664/15 Protect Natur-, Arten- und Landschaftsschutz
Umweltorganisation EU:C:2017:760, para 59.
52
As held first by the Court in the LZ I case, and repeated also in the Protect case. See also
R. Widdershoven, ‘National Procedural Autonomy and General EU Law Limits’, in this special
issue of Review of European Administrative Law, 5.
53
See e.g. Case C-682/15 Berlioz Investment Fund SA v Directeur de l’administration des contributions
directes EU:C:2017:373. On this point see further, M Bonelli, ‘Effective Judicial Protection in
54
EU Law: an Evolving Principle of a Constitutional Nature’, in this special issue of Review of
European Administrative Law, 35.
For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that actually the most recent of the cases on
procedural secondary rules in the field of environmental law is Case C-167/17 Volkmar Klohn
55
v An Bord Pleanála EU:C:2018:833. In this case, the question posed by the national court revolved,
amongst others, around the direct effect of Article 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention. Here the
Court only peripherally mentioned the principles of effectiveness and effective judicial protection
(in the framework of a statement on the discretion left to Member States in transposing Directive
2003/35), but solved the case on the basis of the orthodox requirements for direct effect and
consistent interpretation. The case does therefore not change any of the conclusions which
arise from Protect and Pylon.
Case C-470/16 North East Pylon Pressure Campaign Limited and Maura Sheehy v An Bord Pleanála
and Others EU:C:2018:185.
56
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somewhat opaque fashion) the effective protection of EU environmental law
and the effectiveness of the protection of the rights stemming from EU law.57
5. Conclusion
This contribution embarked upon the challenging task of try-
ing to make sense of the case law of the Court of Justice which engaged with
the procedural provisions stemming from the Aarhus Convention and its
transposition in the EU legal system and their relationship with the principles
of effectiveness and effective judicial protection, as well as Article 47 of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights.
The analysis carried out with respect to the ‘older’ case law, dealing with the
second paragraph of Article 9 and the transposing EU Directive, shows a
somewhat incoherent and unpredictable approach on the part of the Court of
Justice with respect to how it understands the relationship between procedural
principles and secondary procedural rules. Much seems to depend on the spe-
cifics of the case (including how the questions are phrased in preliminary
questions and how the arguments are built by the Commission in infringement
proceedings), and little general guidance can be distilled. What seems to be the
case is that, when the principle of effectiveness was recalled, it was not the de-
cisive factor to lead the court to the final outcome. The principle of effective
judicial protection is, in this strand of case law, next to non-existent.
The tide started to turn with LZ I, where, in the context of Article 9(3) of the
Convention (which currently lacks transposition at the EU level), the Court
starts speaking ‘the language of rights’ – albeit without a reference to the Charter.
This reference comes instead prominently to the fore in LZII. In this case, the
Court’s main argument to grant standing to the concerned NGO revolved around
Article 47, which in the Court’s view had to be read in combination with the
right to public participation enshrined in the Aarhus Convention. This trend
was forcefully confirmed in Protect, in which again Article 47 was used as the
main instrument to ensure the effectiveness of the Aarhus Convention. The
Protect case seems also to confirm the expansive trend with respect to the use
of Charter which the Court deems applicable also in the absence of a clear EU
law-conferred right (possibly at the expense of the principle of effectiveness,
“Therefore, if the effective protection of EU environmental law, in this case Directive 2011/92
and Regulation No 347/2013, is not to be undermined, it is inconceivable that Article 9(3) and
57
(4) of the Aarhus Convention be interpreted in such a way as to make it in practice impossible
or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by EU law”. Ibid [56].
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which seeems no longer to be useful in assessing most national procedural
rules).58
Clearly, this development can constitute a powerful weapon in the hands of
the Court to boost the effectiveness of the Aarhus Convention, especially in
areas which are not covered by Article 9(2) of the Convention, since national
procedural rules applicable in environmental litigation will need to comply with
Article 47 of the Charter to be ‘Aarhus-proof.’ Time will tell whether this ‘testing
phase’ in the use of Article 47, in the context of environmental litigation will
turn into a steady position of the Court. One final – and unfortunately
sombering – reflexion deserves to be made with respect to a possible reading
of this very forthcoming case law in light of the rigid closure on the part of the
Court, with respect to access to justice in enviromental matters before the
European Courts. In a long line of case law,59 the Court has continued to apply
the Plaumann requirements to environmental claims, to the effect that environ-
mental NGOs are virtually barred from accessing the European courts in annul-
ment actions.60 This attitude escalated in the long and as of yet unsresolved
dispute before the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee,61 which has
ultimately declared the EU in breach of the access to justice provisions of Aarhus
Convention for its too restrictive standing rules applicable before the European
Courts. The ‘double standard’ applied by the Court of Justice to national proce-
dural rules which are forcefully censored when they are deemed too restrictive,
as compared to that applied to its own rules, which the Court has always deemed
acceptable, cannot go unnoticed. In this light, the EU has always sought to de-
fend itself against the attacks on its restrictive standing rules with the argument
that direct actions at EU level ought be read in combination with the possibility
of seizing national courts and in those national, indirectly accessing the Court
of Justice through a preliminary question of validity under Article 267 TFEU.62
For the limited, yet continued importance of the principle of effectiveness, see R. Widdershoven,
‘National Procedural Autonomy and General EU Law Limits’, in this special issue of Review
of European Administrative Law, 5.
58
See e.g. Case T-91/07 WWF-UK v Council EU:T:2008:170 (confirmed in appeal in C-355/08
P); Case T-236/04 EEB and Stichting Natuur en Milieu v Commission EU:T:2005:426; Case T-
59
37/04 Região autónoma dos Açores v Council EU:T:2008:236 (confirmed in appeal in C-444/08
P).
See for a recent overview of these developments, M. van Wolferen and M. Eliantonio, ‘Chapter
10. Access to Justice in Environmental Matters: The EU’s difficult road towards non-compliance
60
with the Aarhus Convention’|in M. Peeters and M. Eliantonio (eds), Research Handbook of EU
Environmental Law (Edward Elgar, forthcoming).
Findings and Recommendations of the Compliance Committee with regard to Communication
ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part II) Concerning Compliance by the European Union, available at un-
61
ece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2008-32/Findings/C32_EU_Find-
ings_as_adopted_advance_unedited_version.pdf accessed 14 October 2019.
See e.g. the official response to the Findings of the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee:
“the ACCC should acknowledge that, on the basis of settled case-law of the CJEU, within the
62
jurisdictional system of the Union, national judges (as “juge communautaire du droit commun”)
and courts play a central role for implementing Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention”. Com-
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In this light, it is not unlikely that the bold move in Protect is yet another signal
from the Court that recourse against environmental violations is, first and
foremost, to be sought at the national level, because the systems of remedies
is allegedly “complete”.63
ments by the European Commission, on behalf of the European Union, to the draft findings
and recommendations by the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee with regard to
Communication ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part II) concerning compliance by the European Union
in connection with access by members of the public to review procedures, available at un-
ece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2008-
32/From_Party/frPartyC32_18.10.2016_comments_draft_findings.pdf para 24, accessed 14
October 2019.
The Court’s position is expressed in a steady line of case law, see e.g. Case C-583/11P Inuit Tapiriit
Kanatami a.o. v European Parliament and Council EU:C:2013:625, paras 89 and ff.
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